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risk-free versions of providence, but that it does worse. One central issue 
concerning the morality of risk is how the risk is distributed among those 
involved in the event. Welty points out that whatever the risks are that 
God takes, he does not suffer from them the way human beings often do. 
Welty asks a series of questions such as, “Will [God] perish due to lack of 
food, water, shelter, and good health? No.” This one question is enough 
to see that for all the talk of God’s risks, on open theism, it is the crea-
tures that are most vulnerable. There is at least a prima facie case that God 
is more morally responsible if he adopts risky providence by creating a 
world with an open future than if he maintains a risk-free providence.
Welty’s essay is simply excellent. His treatment of these themes is very 
careful. He draws on the writings of open theists as he lays out the details 
of the four relevant aspects of the problem of evil. In addition, he raises 
relevant objections to his assessments and answers them. This chapter will 
provide impetus for continued work for years to come.
In a short review, I can do no more than gesture at the contents of this 
book. Many of the essays warrant a deeper look. The collection as a whole 
has several strengths that are worth mentioning. First, the papers vary 
widely in topic and in philosophical perspective. They range over several 
metaphysical issues as well as issues more central to philosophical theol-
ogy. The collection demonstrates that issues related to divine foreknowl-
edge touch a wider variety of the different fields within philosophy than 
might be expected. The authors also vary in their philosophical commit-
ments. Some are compatibilists and some are libertarians. Some are atem-
poralists and some hold that God is temporal. This diversity strengthens 
the collection. Third, the quality of each essay is very good. Both open 
theists and critics of open theism will find much to think about. I highly 
recommend this work.
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Scott Davison orients his investigation of petitionary prayer around the 
following pair of questions: “Assuming that the God of traditional theism 
exists, is it reasonable to think that God answers specific petitionary 
prayers? Or are those prayers pointless in the sense that they do not in-
fluence God’s action?” (7–8). Davison begins by admitting that he origi-
nally planned to argue that the answers to those questions are no and yes, 




respectively. However, in the course of his investigation he realized he 
could only defend the much more moderate claim that some petitionary 
prayer is likely pointless. I appreciate Davison’s clear articulation of both 
the intentional limitations and modest goals of his investigation. He states 
many times that he is addressing an “artificial philosopher’s question” 
(8) in that he is examining petitionary prayer only insofar as it is a way 
to potentially influence God, and in that he is carrying out this examina-
tion by focusing exclusively on the overlap between petitionary prayer 
and various mainstream philosophical issues. This approach enables 
him to address a wide range of issues lucidly and insightfully. To make 
sense of the relationships between the many topics that he covers, we can 
group the chapters into four sections. In the first section (chapters 1 and 
2) Davison makes note of important distinctions and definitions, and also 
presents his main positive account of petitionary prayer. In the second sec-
tion (chapters 3, 6, 7, and 8) he addresses mainly metaphysical and ethical 
issues relating to petitionary prayer, and in the third section (chapters 4 
and 5) he addresses epistemological issues. Finally, in the fourth section 
(chapters 9 and 10) he addresses the relationship between faith and prayer 
as well as some practical reasons in favor of petitionary prayer, in addition 
to summarizing the rest of the book.
In his first two chapters, Davison presents his account of what petition-
ary prayers are and what it means for God to answer them. He distinguishes 
types of petitionary prayer from tokens (those offered by a particular per-
son or group, in a particular time and place) and identifies the three main 
components of a petitionary prayer: 1) the petitioning subject; 2) the act 
of requesting (through petitionary prayer); and 3) the object requested. 
The object requested in a petitionary prayer may be a substance, event, or 
state of affairs and may be requested for oneself (self-directed petitionary 
prayer) or someone else (other-directed petitionary prayer). Davison then 
analyzes what it means for God to answer a petitionary prayer, highlight-
ing three components. God answers S’s petitionary prayer requesting E iff: 
1) God brings about E (if not, God at most merely responds to the prayer); 2) 
God desires to bring about E just because S prayed for it (note that this de-
sire need not serve as God’s only reason for bringing about E); 3) this desire 
is an essential component of a “true contrastive explanation” (38) of God’s 
bringing about E rather than not (in other words, an explanation of why 
God brought about E would fail if this desire was absent from it). Davison 
sees this, his Contrastive Reasons Account (CRA), as a middle way be-
tween accounts of petitionary prayer that require too much (like counter-
factual dependence accounts) and those that require too little (like Pruss’s 
omnirationality account. After establishing his account of petitionary 
prayer, Davison addresses the following two questions in the remainder 
of the book: (1) Does this account of petitionary prayer fit with what we 
believe about God (in particular, what we believe about God’s freedom 
and goodness)? And (2) Can we know that God has answered a particular 
petitionary prayer of ours?
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In chapters 3, 6, 7 and 8, Davison addresses specific versions of the first 
question. In chapter 3, he focuses on how competing theories of divine 
freedom might challenge his account of petitionary prayer. After thor-
oughly evaluating various challenges he concludes that none pose signifi-
cant problems for the traditional theist. In chapters 6 and 7, he addresses 
the apparent tension between God’s goodness and petitionary prayer: if 
petitionary prayer is efficacious, God’s provision of at least some good 
things depends on us offering certain petitionary prayers. Most defenses 
of petitionary prayer argue that some good is significant enough to jus-
tify this setup. Davison examines many such defenses and finds most 
lacking, particularly when applied to cases in which God’s provision of 
important goods depends on petitionary prayers. However, he does find 
responsibility-based defenses of other-directed prayer promising—those 
that identify increased human responsibility of the sort made possible 
by petitionary prayer, as a “significant enough” good. In chapter 8, he 
turns to defenses of self-directed prayer, two of which he finds promis-
ing. One is the autonomy defense (a modified version of a defense offered 
by Stump) of self-directed prayers for permission-required direct divine 
goods. According to this defense, in order to preserve our autonomy in 
certain cases, God requires self-directed petitionary prayers before chang-
ing things like one’s tendency towards sinful behavior. Davison also finds 
the modified case-by-case defense (versions of which have been offered by 
Murray, Meyers, and Flint) promising for a limited set of self- and other-
directed petitionary prayers. According to this defense, God determines 
whether to require petitionary prayers on an individual basis rather than 
according to a general policy. The upshot of these chapters is that there are 
only a few promising defenses of petitionary prayer, and these defenses 
are limited in application to specific types of petitionary prayer.
In chapters 4 and 5, Davison engages with the second question men-
tioned above: whether we can know that God has answered a particular 
petitionary prayer of ours. He explains that, according to many theistic 
traditions, we can know both that God, in general, answers petitionary 
prayers, and that God has historically answered some particular petitionary 
prayers; however, this does not settle the question of whether or not I can 
know that God has answered my petitionary prayer. In chapter 4, Davison 
addresses challenges to our ability to have such knowledge, ultimately 
identifying the safety-based challenge as most worrisome. According to 
this challenge if I pray for E and God brings about E, I cannot know that 
God has answered my prayer because there are nearby possible worlds 
in which God brings about E for reasons independent of my petitionary 
prayer, but in which I still believe that God has answered my prayer. In 
this case, the third criterion of Davison’s CRA is unfulfilled—I cannot know 
whether God has answered a particular prayer of mine because I do not 
know his reasons for bringing something about. In chapter 5, Davison 
examines particular Christian teachings to determine whether they can 
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justify our claims to such knowledge—concluding that they cannot. The 
upshot of these chapters is that, claiming to have “knowledge of specific 
answered petitionary prayers” is, at best, highly dubious.
In his final two chapters, he briefly addresses additional practical puz-
zles for, and reasons in favor of, petitionary prayer, as well as interesting 
connections between faith and petitionary prayer. He also explains that 
one of the main upshots of this work is that while there are some promis-
ing defenses of petitionary prayer, these defenses are limited in scope and 
have to reckon with many of the pressing challenges he has engaged with 
throughout the book. Furthermore, he reiterates some of the intentional 
limitations he imposed on his investigation, which have helped him focus 
on particular philosophical issues, but also limit the practical implications 
of his conclusion.
Overall, I find Davison’s investigation compelling; however, I will offer 
a few friendly suggestions. First, his investigation of petitionary prayer 
could benefit from a more detailed treatment of what constitutes the 
object of a petitionary prayer, what components of a petitionary prayer 
communicate this object, and what qualifies as bringing about the object. 
Davison does not say much about how to determine the object of a peti-
tionary prayer, instead he seems to assume the object is expressed by some 
portion of what the petitioner articulates to God while she is praying. This 
understanding of the object of a prayer seems intuitive, but it does not 
help us make sense of the cases below. Take the following example of a 
petitionary prayer and three ways in which God might respond:
Prayer: a person (S) prays for her mother to be healed from an illness 
(E).
Response A: S’s mother is healed two months after S’s prayer.
Response B: S’s mother suffers intensely for the next thirty years, at 
which point she is healed. A week after being healed she dies due to 
unrelated causes.
Response C: S’s mother is never healed.
In responses A and B, God brings about what appears to be the object of 
S’s prayer, while in response C he does not. If we add the assumption that 
responses A and B fulfill the second two criteria of Davison’s CRA in ad-
dition to the first, then on Davison’s account they both count as answers 
to S’s prayer. However, there is a sense in which response B does not seem 
like a true answer to S’s prayer, or at the very least it seems like a clearly 
worse answer than response A. We can make sense of this difference by 
adding some intuitively plausible components to the original situation: 
(1) S prays for E with a sense of urgency, and (2) one of S’s motivations for 
prayer was her desire for her mother to live a significant portion of the rest 
of her life in a relatively healthy and minimally painful state. Importantly, 
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S does not articulate either of these two components as part of her prayer 
for E. Although these two components seem to make an important dif-
ference to how we understand the object S requests and what counts as 
an answer (or at least a good answer) to S’s prayer, it is unclear how they 
would fit into Davison’s account of petitionary prayer. Take another case:
Prayer: a person (S) prays for a job as a teacher (E). S’s underlying but 
unarticulated motivation for this prayer is that she wants to have a job 
that she finds fulfilling.
Response A: S does not get a job as a teacher but instead gets a job as an 
artist, which she finds fulfilling.
Response B: S gets a job as a teacher, which she does not find fulfilling.
Again, assuming the second two criteria of his CRA are fulfilled, accord-
ing to Davison, response B is an answer to S’s prayer while response A is 
not. However, response A seems clearly preferable to, and in some sense 
a better answer than, response B. Similar to the first case above, in this 
second case some component (S’s motivation) that is not addressed by 
Davison’s account seems to make a crucial difference in which response is 
preferable, and interestingly, in this case the mere response seems prefer-
able to the answer.
It is important to note that my worry is not primarily about whether 
we can properly classify certain responses as answers to petitionary 
prayers—in fact, Davison sees it as a virtue of his account that it does 
not provide criteria that enables precise classification. Rather, my worry is 
that because Davison’s account is either underspecified or too narrow—in 
terms of what features of the petitioner or the request itself inform either 
the object of the prayer and/or what counts as bringing about the object 
of prayer—it is unclear why we should care (at least as much as Davison 
thinks we should) about receiving answers and having knowledge of an-
swers to our prayers. In both cases above, God’s answering (according to 
Davison’s account) S’s prayer is not what makes the particular response 
preferable, rather it is the fact that God’s response satisfies some addi-
tional component (motivation, desire, etc.) either in addition to, or in place 
of, S’s explicit request for the object of her prayer. This is both in tension 
with what many religious believers think about answers to prayer and 
seems to undercut (or at least call into question) some of Davison’s moti-
vation for focusing on God’s answers to our petitionary prayers. Davison 
may well have a helpful response to this worry—it is just unclear what it 
would be, based on the level of detail he provides in his account.
Second, Davison’s account could also benefit from a clearer articulation 
of the importance of the particular kind of knowledge that he focuses on—
namely, an individual’s knowledge that God has answered her particular 
petitionary prayer. At the end of his epistemological discussion, Davison 
concludes that I likely cannot know whether God has answered my par-
ticular petitionary prayer. In later chapters he references this conclusion 
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in relation to many of the defenses that he addresses, often noting that 
they suffer because we lack this kind of knowledge. For example, in ad-
dressing Stump’s defense of petitionary prayer that emphasizes the role 
that such prayer plays in preventing humans from being either spoiled 
or overwhelmed by God’s provision, Davison claims that Stump’s de-
fense relies on an assumption that “created persons know that God has 
answered their prayers, which is problematic, as we saw in chapters 4 
and 5” (134–135). Davison makes a similar point in response to a defense 
from Frances Howard-Snyder and Daniel Howard-Snyder which focuses 
on the fact that petitionary prayer enables us to recognize and be grateful 
to God as the source of good provision. Davison makes the point that this 
defense is undermined by the fact that “created persons do not typically 
know that they have received things from God as a result of petitionary 
prayers” (131).
Although when engaging with some other defenses Davison provides 
compelling explanations of why knowledge might be required for the 
goods emphasized therein, and when engaging with at least one defense 
he notes that the good in question may only require justified belief, when 
engaging with the defenses above he does neither. Taking into account the 
fact that traditional theists know both that God, in general, answers peti-
tionary prayers and that God has answered some particular petitionary 
prayers in the past—it seems plausible that one could rely on this knowl-
edge to believe, quite reasonably, that God has answered their particular 
petitionary prayers. And it further seems that these beliefs would suffice 
for bringing about some of the goods Davison claims require knowledge. 
For example, this belief could easily lead one to be grateful to God. In 
short, in both examples mentioned above (in addition to others) it is not 
yet clear from Davison’s discussion why the goods mentioned require 
knowledge that God has answered one’s petitionary prayers, rather than 
belief. Again, Davison may well have a good response to this—if so, his 
earlier epistemological discussion as well as his discussion of these par-
ticular defenses’s epistemological issues could benefit from further expla-
nation on this point.
As I mentioned above, these are friendly suggestions for further expla-
nation of concepts that are central to Davison’s investigation. Petitionary 
Prayer is a thorough and informative book-length treatment of a subject 
that is woefully underdiscussed. Davison engages his many interlocuters 
fairly and carefully, and in so doing gives a comprehensive overview of 
the current state-of-play of the literature on this topic. Davison empha-
sizes that he hopes that his “discussion sheds new light on the philosophi-
cal issues, leads others to investigate them in further detail, and raises 
new questions for further study” (6). In this, Petitionary Prayer has already 
succeeded and will surely continue to do so!
